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Social engineering is an ever-growing problem in 
online and offline communication. Companies invest 
time and resources to train employees not to fall victim 
to attacks. The concept of adversarial thinking 
encourages people to learn the ways of the attacker to 
better defend themselves. This research introduces the 
design features of a chatbot that plays the role of a 
social engineering victim to allow people to perform the 
role of an attacker in a training exercise. By attacking 
this chatbot, people can learn better how to defend 
themselves.   
1. Introduction  
Social Engineering (SE), in its broadest definition, 
is the act of “skillfully maneuvering human beings to 
take action in some aspect of their lives” [1, p. 10]. 
When used in a cybersecurity context, SE refers to an 
attack vector that takes advantage of human habits and 
biases to gain unauthorized access to resources or 
information. Common social engineering techniques 
include phishing (the use of SE techniques over email 
en masse), shoulder surfing (peering over someone’s 
shoulder to obtain confidential information from the 
screen), vishing (calling and pretending to be someone 
else to get information), smishing (a phishing attack 
conducted over SMS messages), and spear phishing 
(targeted phishing). SE techniques are employed to get 
access to confidential information or systems from 
businesses, organizations, or individuals.  
Social engineering is a major security problem for 
many organizations. The Verizon Data Breach 
Investigation Report identified 3,841 SE incidents in 
2020 [2]. SE breaches cost companies and countries 
billions of dollars every year [3].  As a result, companies 
dedicate resources developing policies and training 
employees to comply with those policies. 
The challenge of SE is that it circumvents technical 
security measures and exploits human decision-making 
to gather information [4]. Building an effective defense 
against SE in an organization frequently involves 
training and development of effective policies to 
encourage employees to adhere to good security 
practices. For example, many organizations conduct 
internal phishing attacks to evaluate employee’s 
understanding of good security practices [5]. 
Companies struggle with providing SE training that 
employees find interesting [6]. Researchers have 
techniques to make engaging training through 
mindfulness [7], embedded training [8], competition 
[9], just-in-time feedback [9], adversarial thinking 
[authors], and role-play [10]. While some of the 
technology that has been produced has achieved decent 
engagement ratings from participants, there is still room 
to improve. 
Additionally, most of the attention has been focused 
on emails and phishing. With the growing interest in 
chat customer support services, there is need to have SE 
training in other contexts that employees find 
interesting. There is growing interest in training from 
the perspective of the attacker, called adversarial 
thinking [11]. Very little research on adversarial training 
has been produced, and even less in the SE context.  
Because of the social nature of SE attacks, chatbots 
have a unique advantage compared to other 
technologies: they use natural language and elicit social 
responses from users [12]. We have developed a chatbot 
to perform a role in training to give users direct 
experience with the SE concepts they learn. We want the 
chatbot to engage users and teach effectively so learners 
can recognize SE techniques in the future and avoid 
becoming victims of an attack. As part of this 
development, we propose the following research 
question: 
RQ1: What are the design features of a chatbot 
necessary to provide engaging and adversarial 
training? 
As we work to develop a chatbot-enabled training 
on social engineering, we need to examine its efficacy 
compared to traditional methods. While chatbots are 
increasingly used to teach in various contexts (e.g., 
[13]), their efficacy is still an area ripe for study. It may 
also be that the social capabilities of a chatbot have 
detrimental effects on desired outcomes [14]. We 
therefore seek to study this second research question: 






RQ2: Does a chatbot-enabled SE training provide 
better learning outcomes compared to traditional 
methods of training? 
We use a design science methodology [15]–[17] to 
answer our research question. The design science 
methodology has six steps: (1) identify the problem to 
explore; (2) define the objectives of a solution; (3) 
design and develop an artifact as a possible 
implementation of our solution criteria; (4) demonstrate 
the use of the artifact; (5) evaluate the potential value of 
the artifact; and (6) communicate the design and 
significance of the artifact and findings [17]. We will 
describe the development of a chatbot capable of 
producing conversations where participants can pretend 
to be an attacker trying to obtain a password through SE. 
2. Social Engineering Training 
Much of the training around social engineering in 
companies is defensive in nature c.f., [7]–[10]. 
Employees are taught what social engineering is, the 
potential damage it can cause, and the risks to their own 
employment if they fall victim to such an attack. 
Some research in the cybersecurity realm has 
demonstrated the effectiveness of adversarial thinking 
to help train security professionals to think like the 
attacker. Adversarial thinking involves shifting 
perspective to think like an attacker would. Adopting 
this mindset can help users better understand what 
attacks might come, how they might come, and what 
defenses they can employ. We designed our chatbot to 
give users an adversarial experience with SE, so they 
can better understand how SE attacks are conducted. 
With this in mind, we aim to increase adversarial 
thinking in those who use the SE Victim. 
Traditional SE training consists of videos, online 
modules, and/or quizzes to test understanding. 
Typically, this training focuses on compliance with 
policies, restricting access to facilities, locking 
computers, or on phishing, one of the most common SE 
attack vectors. These trainings are often limited in their 
ability to engage learners due to a lack of interactivity. 
To stage an interactive SE training, organizations run 
into issues of scalability, as these would typically 
involve live training where a few people attempt social 
engineering tactics in front of the class, or perhaps role 
play with each other. But the social nature of the attacks 
means that usually at least two people are required for 
the conversation. Chatbots provide a way to have a 
conversation with only one person, enhancing the 
application of SE training so that everyone can try out 
the tactics they are learning about. Our goal is not to 
create excellent social engineers who can later carry out 
attacks. Rather, our goal is to increase understanding of 
SE through the application of techniques with a 
simulated SE victim. 
With a design science methodology, after defining 
the problem to explore, we need to define the objectives 
of the solution. There are three objectives that an 
adversarial chat-based SE training needs to accomplish: 
1. Allow the user to practice various SE techniques, 
2. Provide the user feedback on what works and what 
does not work, and 
3. Create a realistic environment, i.e., make it feel like 
there is a person on the other end. 
The following sections will first explain the general 
engine of the chatbot, second, the scenario that allows 
users to use SE techniques, third, how the chatbot 
provides feedback to the user by making decisions, and 
fourth, how the chatbot engages in natural conversation. 
3. Scenario & Conversation Flow 
In the current study, participants interacting with 
the victim chatbot are provided with a scenario to 
practice SE techniques using RASA, a popular chatbot 
software. In the scenario, they are told to act as the 
assistant to Lina Cassler, the CTO of RipTech, a 
fictional company. In a chat interaction with tech 
support at their company, they are to try to convince 
Janet, the tech support agent, to provide them with the 
password to Lina’s account. 
The flow of conversation is presented in Figure 1 
and is described here. When users first arrive at the chat 
page, they enter a message to begin the conversation. 
The chatbot introduces itself as Janet, the technical 
support agent. Janet uses a robot graphic as the avatar, 
and we make no attempt to deceive users about the 
nature of their conversation with a bot. 
Once the user and chatbot have introduced 
themselves, the users can begin to attempt their social 
engineering to get the password. Each message is 
evaluated to determine if it satisfies certain criteria.  
The first branch of conversation is if the user is 
requesting the password. If the user never requests the 
password, then Janet will never give them the password, 
regardless of the social engineering techniques 
employed. If the password has been requested, we set a 
variable in Rasa to store that, and the chatbot will 
respond appropriately. 
The next check is to determine if a social 
engineering technique is being used. These checks are 
performed in series, and a single message can be both a 
password request and an SE technique. For example, if 
the user said, “I really need to get Lina’s password in the 
next 10 minutes or I’m going to get fired,” that would 
be an example of the urgency technique combined with 
a password request. If the chatbot recognizes an SE 




























Janet says she cant 




Janet engages in 
generic 
conversation
Janet: I'm not allowed 
to send out passwords 
like this, have the 
account owner 
contact me.
User: I don't mean to 
pressure you, but we need 
the password before Lina 
goes in a meeting
Janet: Thanks for chatting 
RipTech, my name is Janet. 
how can I help you?
User: Hello
Janet: Is there 
anything else I can 
help you with?
Has 
password ever been 
requested
Janet: Okay, I'll give 
you the password, but 
I'll have to reach out 
to Lina later today to 




The crux of “passing” our social engineering 
training is through this resistance metric. In our current 
design, resistance is a singular metric to measure if users 
have adequately engineered the chatbot to convince it to 
provide the password. The Janet chatbot starts users 
with a resistance level of 50, and each social engineering 
attempt decreases that value by a random amount 
between 20 and 30. Once the resistance level reaches 0, 
the chatbot will give out the password (as long as it has 
been requested). These values were chosen based on 
intuition and will be excellent targets for future research. 
Ideas for future developments are discussed later in this 
paper.  
At this point, dialog management takes over and 
Janet selects the response appropriate based on the state 
of conversation. If the user has requested the password 
and the resistance metric meets the threshold, the 
chatbot “reluctantly” provides the password in the chat. 
If the password has been requested, but resistance is not 
yet low enough, the chatbot responds that it cannot give 
the password at this time. The response is tied to the SE 
technique used in the last message.  For example, if the 
user employed urgency as in the example above, Janet 
could respond with “I know you're in a rush and I want 
to help, but it's against policy to send out personal 
information.” Finally, if no password has been 
requested, and resistance has not met the threshold, 
Janet will respond with a generic message to encourage 
further conversation. 
4. SE Victim Architecture 
There are many platforms for developing chatbots. 
One popular option is Rasa (https://rasa.com/)–an open 
source platform for developing machine learning-based 
chatbots. We chose Rasa for its flexibility and 
programmability. Rasa’s platform allows for Python 
code to be integrated into the conversation cycle, 
allowing for powerful customization and capabilities. 
The development of a Rasa chatbot is composed of two 
major components: natural language understanding 
(NLU) and dialog management. NLU is the machine 
learning process of understanding user messages, 
parsing the meaning they are trying to convey, and 
extracting necessary information from those messages. 
Dialog management relates to how the chatbot 
determines what a user is doing in the conversation and 
how the chatbot’s next message is chosen. Rasa 
provides both components to create a chatbot, though 
they can be used independently. The functionality of 
Rasa is similar to Google's DialogFlow or Amazon's 
Lex, with the added benefit of being open source and 
self-hosted, giving more control over the functionality 
and security of the data. 
Rasa uses supervised machine learning to perform 
the natural language understanding (NLU) tasks. Using 
advanced modern language processing techniques, Rasa 
can understand a variety of speech patterns to create a 
natural flow of conversation with a modest amount of 
training. After evaluating other products, including 
DialogFlow and Microsoft's Bot Framework, we chose 
Rasa for its ease of use and customizability.  
The primary building blocks of a Rasa bot are 
intents, responses, and stories. An intent is the user's 
presumed intent with an utterance. For example, if a user 
talking to an Echo device were to say "Alexa, set an 
alarm for 10:30," the intent could be named something 
like set_alarm. Separate intents would be needed for 
each of the possible tasks or types of messages users 
may want to send. Training data would then be used to 
provide the machine learning algorithm with many 
examples of how users might want to express the intent 
to set an alarm. For example: 
• Set an alarm for 10:30 
• I need an alarm set for 8:15 
• Wake me up at 6:30 
• Set an alarm 
Each training phrase is unique and forms an input 
to the model that will eventually be used to classify the 
message by its intent.  
In short, the Rasa framework provides natural 
language understanding to process user messages, 
dialog management to select appropriate responses, and 
connections to other platforms to integrate the chat. All 
of these are invaluable for creating a natural 
conversational flow. 
The SE victim chatbot is designed to provide 
feedback to the user based on whether it gives away the 
password or not. The chatbot is designed to recognize 
different SE tactics. Chatbots use intents (or categories) 
to recognize user patterns. The intents we used centered 
on the primary categories of social engineering tactics 
used to get information: Urgency, threats, consensus, 
authority, reciprocity, and fear of missing out.  For 
example, if the user decided to try a reciprocity 
approach, they might say something like the following: 
• If you can get me this password, I can put in a 
good word with the boss. 
• Listen, if you help me this one time, I can help 
you out 
• Hey listen, I know you're up for a raise. Send 
me the password and I'll put in a good word. 
When users employ different strategies, the NLU 
module classifies the intent and selects the appropriate 
response. Rasa’s responses provide the chatbot with a 
variety of ways to reply to user messages. In Rasa, 
responses are created independently of the intents, so 
they can be reused or remixed to provide the right kind 
of conversation. The chatbot developer can introduce 
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variety to the responses so users are less likely to get 
repetitive messages from the chatbot. In the SE victim 
chatbot, we gave the chatbot several ways to deny users 
when they repeatedly asked for the password before 
employing social engineering techniques: 
• I still can't just send you the password. 
• Listen, I would love to help, but I really can't 
send it to you. 
• I can't give you the password over this channel. 
Have the account owner call me. 
• Like I said, I can't just give you the password 
info. 
This variety mimics a human conversation, because 
a person chatting would not simply repeat the exact 
same message over and over again [12]. In our case, we 
have different responses based on the strategy the user 
is using to pressure the chatbot. For example, if the user 
tries to use reciprocity, the chatbot would respond with 
one of the following: 
• I'd love the help, but I would get in trouble for 
sending personal info 
• I really appreciate your interest, but I would 
have to have the account owner call me 
• That's really thoughtful, but I really shouldn't 
send personal information to you 
Stories are Rasa's way of controlling the flow of 
conversation. On their own, intents and responses are 
not linked, and provide no actual conversation. With 
stories, you can define a sequence of intents and 
responses that you expect users to follow. Intent 
detection understands what users want to do, and the 
responses guide them to the next step in the story. 
Multiple stories can be combined in a single 
conversation to handle the entire conversation and 
variety of ways people communicate. 
Much of Rasa's strength comes from its 
customizability and programmability. Because the 
functions of Rasa are built with Python and provide 
bindings to allow programmatic access, the ways we can 
use Rasa are limited only by our programming ability. 
The crux of our social engineering victim chatbot is 
using Rasa's action server to power custom 
functionality. Creating custom actions gives us access to 
functions beyond the NLU itself. The chatbot's model of 
resistance is managed using a custom action. At the 
beginning of the interaction, the chatbot has a base level 
of "resistance" that users must decrease through their 
actions. In this case, resistance is an umbrella term 
covering a variety of responses to social engineering. 
The purpose is to force users to "wear down" the victim 
through repeating strategies or trying different strategies 
to get the information. The resistance metric decreases 
when users employ one of the SE tactics, although the 
users cannot see what their resistance level is. Once the 
resistance has passed below the defined threshold, the 
user can ask for the password and the chatbot will 
"reluctantly" respond with the password. 
The purpose of the resistance metric is to mimic the 
way a social engineering attack might happen in the 
wild. Social engineering attacks are often based on the 
attacker developing rapport with the target. The tactics 
identified in social engineering research work to "soften 
up" the target and make them more likely to give up 
information that they should not. With the current SE 
victim, there is no way for users to increase resistance—
it only decreases. Future iterations will also include the 
possibility of "locking themselves out" by arousing 
suspicion or employing tactics improperly. 
Entity recognition in NLU is the process of 
identifying keywords or phrases that carry special 
significance. For example, when responding to “What is 
your name,” you might say “I’m Alice,” or “My name 
is Alice,” or one of many other ways you might 
introduce yourself. Entity recognition would be used to 
extract “Alice” as the name regardless of how the 
introduction was phrased.  
Once the entity is extracted, it can be immediately 
used, or stored in a slot. Slots are like Rasa’s long-term 
memory. They can be used to store information for a 
short time, or for the duration of the conversation. In the 
example of the user’s name, a slot called name could be 
used to store the name, then future responses could 
incorporate the name (e.g., “Nice to see you again, 
Alice.”). 
We use entity recognition to identify when users are 
referring to the CTO who was the target of the attack, 
and when users were asking for the password or login 
information. We use slots to remember if the requests 
had been made, and only if that information has been 
requested will the chatbot provide the password. 
5. Testing, Evaluation, and Iteration 
Testing the chatbot with users is a critical 
component of development. Just as with user testing in 
other research and development fields, conversations 
with actual users have no substitute. The Rasa team has 
developed the term “Conversation Driven 
Development” or CDD to refer to an iterative 
development process involving early and frequent 
interactions with users [18]. 
CDD is valuable for conversational agent 
development because natural language is so infinitely 
variable. There is no way for any person or group of 
people to predict all the ways another group will choose 
to interact with a chatbot. Rather than attempt to predict 
all possible conversation styles, CDD proposes that 
conversational tests with users be used repeatedly 
during the development process to identify weaknesses 
and to iteratively improve the chatbot using the 
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conversations as input for training machine learning 
models and shaping conversations.  
The first test of our SE victim was conducted with 
a small class of cybersecurity students. After a class 
lecture on social engineering, students were given a link 
to the chatbot and brief instructions about the pretext 
associated with the chatbot (as described in Section 3 
above). Then they were given free rein to interact with 
the bot, including the option to restart the conversation 
as many times as they wanted. Our main goal with these 
participants was to gather more data on how participants 
comfortable with concepts of social engineering would 
approach the bot. 
Surprisingly, in our initial tests some users would 
begin their conversation and never indicate what exactly 
they needed from the chatbot. Because it is a contrived 
scenario, users must have assumed that the chatbot knew 
they wanted the password, so they began immediately 
employing social engineering without ever specifying 
their goal. This led to the addition of the slot for 
requesting the password mentioned above. 
The second test of the SE victim was with a large 
class of information systems students enrolled in a 
security and controls class. These students had just 
learned about social engineering and were told to use the 
chatbot to apply the concepts they had learned. While 
their class training was defensive in nature, their attacks 
on the chatbot showed a great deal of creativity and 
insight. In addition to providing more training data for 
our existing intents, examining their conversations 
allowed us to improve the chatbot’s conversation in 
several ways. While quantitative measures were not 
collected in this phase, qualitative assessment of student 
responses suggest the chatbot experience was positive. 
Additionally, many participants restarted the 
conversation multiple times, even after successfully 
obtaining the password, to see if they could obtain the 
password in different ways. 
First, we used the pilot conversations to identify 
new intents to represent a variety of techniques we had 
not considered. One new intent was what we termed 
“minimizing,” where the attackers attempt to convince 
the victim to share information saying things like “No 
one will know,” or “It’s not that big of a deal.”  In this 
way, the attackers hope to reduce the perceived impact 
of the security violation so that the victim will share the 
information. 
Another new intent we saw from our test subjects 
was the “unreachable” intent. In our scenario, attackers 
were attempting to impersonate the assistant to the CTO 
of a fictional company. The chatbot would respond to 
early attempts to access the password by deflecting with 
requests to talk to the CTO herself. Several attackers 
attempted to circumvent this deflection by claiming that 
Lina (the CTO) was unreachable at the moment, but that 
the password needs were urgent. One participant even 
claimed to be Lina’s husband, and that Lina had died 
and her accounts needed to be cleaned up.   
Second, we identified the need for the chatbot to 
handle small talk. Especially with the social nature of a 
social engineering attack, a chatbot needs to be able to 
handle chit chat or banter that attackers use to attempt to 
build rapport with their target. Hobert and Berens [19] 
showed that small talk is important, especially in the 
early stages of a human-chatbot dialog, as users probe 
the capabilities of the chatbot. Here we saw similar 
probing behavior, and have enhanced the chatbot with 
an ability to respond to or deflect small talk.  
6. Future Work 
Our current tests have begun to show the feasibility 
of using the Rasa chatbot framework to create an SE 
victim for the purpose of training users. The studies 
conducted so far have focused on enhancing the 
chatbot’s ability to respond to users and manage 
conversations in a natural way.  
Future work will focus on experimental testing of 
the chatbot’s ability to enhance engagement and 
learning compared to traditional SE training materials. 
We hope to show that through adversarial experience, 
even if simulated, learners get a better appreciation for 
how an attack might happen. We also hope to show that 
a chatbot that enables adversarial thinking improves 
engagement through its interactivity.  
To properly compare the effectiveness of chatbot-
enabled and traditional training, we must first develop a 
reliable measure of understanding of SE concepts. We 
are currently working to develop such a measure. Once 
established, we will conduct experiments to compare 
both theoretical and practical understanding of SE 
concepts after the two types of training.   
In the long term, we also have plans to improve the 
chatbot to make the experience more realistic and 
valuable. One of these plans is to allow the resistance 
value to increase as well as decrease. Currently the 
chatbot only decreases its resistance to the SE attempts, 
resulting in giving out the password eventually as long 
as the user continues to try. In future iterations, the 
chatbot will contain an upper threshold for resistance, 
such that users could “lock” the encounter and the 
chatbot would refuse to respond or give the password at 
all. Some thoughts on how to lock the encounter: 
• Threatening too intensely – threats of violence 
would be unlikely to lead to success in a 
normal social engineering attempt, especially 
over a text chat. 
• Shotgun approach – trying too many different 
social engineering techniques. 
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We also plan to use multiple metrics besides just a 
single resistance metric to model the internal thought 
processes of a victim more accurately. For example, 
suspicion, trust, and liking are three different 
components of how a user approaches a conversation. 
Threats might reduce the resistance metric but increase 
the suspicion metric. We have not decided on specific 
details on how this process will be modeled, but we 
think it will lead to a more accurate representation of 
how social engineering attacks are carried out. 
7. Conclusion 
In summation we have built a chatbot that allows 
people to perform the role of an attacker to better learn 
how to defend themselves. This research introduced the 
design features of a chatbot that plays the role of a social 
engineering victim. Using this chatbot, people should be 
better prepared in the art of adversarial thinking and 
better able to defend themselves from social engineering 
attacks.  
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